Torturing the “Necessary and Proper” Clause

The Story-Taylor Debate on the Scope of the “Necessary and Proper” Clause: Part 1

 Author’s Note: Justice Story presents the erroneous view that congress can do whatever it chooses as means to carry out federal power. Col. Taylor, the author’s agent provocateur, explains why the Story view is false. Col. Taylor’s “views” are thought consistent with his own understanding of the necessary and proper clause, but are presented in the author’s own words.

The article is an excerpt from the forthcoming Volume 3 of The Kiss of Judice: The Constitution Betrayed: A Coroner’s Inquest & Report. More information on the treatise is found at https://douglassbartley.wordpress.com/2012/03/06/the-kiss-of-judice-the-constitution-betrayed-a-coroners-inquest-volumes-1-and-2-2/

Some cross-reference notes have been eliminated, because they don’t at this point correspond with any definite page number in the treatise.

Article 1, §8, Cl. 18—“Congress shall have power . . . to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof

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Coroner: Thank you, President Jackson. It has been an honor to have interviewed you.

Next for a quite contrary view, we bring in one of our regular panelists, Justice Joseph Story, whom President Jackson described as “the most dangerous man in America.”[i] Recall that the story is told of Story that he was so strong a nationalist that as a circuit judge, he absorbed “‘jurisdiction as a sponge took up water,’” and some claimed that ‘if a bucket of water were brought into his court with a corn cob floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States over it.’”[ii]

Welcome, Justice Story

Coroner: Let us consider the “necessary and proper” clause. What do you take as its meaning?

Justice Story

Justice Story: The plain import of the clause is, that congress shall have all the incidental and instrumental powers, necessary and proper to carry into execution all the express powers. It neither enlarges any power specifically granted; nor is it a grant of any new power to congress. But it is merely a declaration for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution those, otherwise granted, are included in the grant. Whenever, therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular power, the first question is, whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be, the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, then it may be exercised by congress. If not, congress cannot exercise it.[iii]

Coroner: So far, no quarrel.

Justice Story: But still a ground of controversy remains open, as to the true interpretation of the terms of the clause; and it has been contested with no small share of earnestness and vigour. What, then, is the true constitutional sense of the words “necessary and proper” in this clause? It has been insisted by the advocates of a rigid interpretation, that the word “necessary” is here used in its close and most intense meaning; so that it is equivalent to absolutely and indispensably necessary. It has been said, that the Constitution allows only the means, which are necessary; not those, which are merely convenient for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a latitude of construction be given to this phrase, as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go far to give every one; for there is no one, which ingenuity might not torture into a convenience in some way or other to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase. Therefore it is, that the Constitution has restrained them to the necessary means; that is to say, to those means, without which the grant of the power would be nugatory. A little difference in the degree of convenience cannot constitute the necessity, which the Constitution refers to.[iv]

Coroner: That’s mostly an accurate description, except for the word “rigid”, which perhaps overstates the contention of the opposition. I think “fixed” a better word.

Justice Story: The effect of this mode of interpretation is to exclude all choice of means; or, at most, to leave to congress in each case those only, which are most direct and simple. If, indeed, such implied powers, and such only, as can be shown to be indispensably necessary, are within the purview of the clause, there will be no end to difficulties, and the express powers must practically become a mere nullity.[v]

Coroner: Col. Taylor is on hand. Let us have him respond to Justice Story.

Col. Taylor of Caroline

Col. Taylor: [“Necessary” means “needful, indispensably requisite”.[vi] Besides that, although there may be difficulties in deciding what is necessary, that doesn’t dispense with the requirement. In fact, for the sake of liberty, the Constitution is designed to make federal power difficult to implement.]

Justice Story: It will be found, that the operations of the government, upon any of its powers, will rarely admit of a rigid demonstration of the necessity (in this strict sense) of the particular means. In most cases, various systems or means may be resorted to, to attain the same end; and yet, with respect to each, it may be argued, that it is not constitutional, because it is not indispensable; and the end may be obtained by other means. The consequence of such reasoning would be, that, as no means could be shown to be constitutional, none could be adopted. For instance, congress possess the power to make war, and to raise armies, and incidentally to erect fortifications, and purchase cannon and ammunition, and other munitions of war. But war may be carried on without fortifications, cannon, and ammunition. No particular kind of arms can be shown to be absolutely necessary; because various sorts of arms of different convenience, power, and utility are, or may be resorted to by different nations. What then becomes of the power?[vii]

Col. Taylor: [Munitions and the like are obviously necessary. He belittles his own position by saying, “war may be carried on without fortifications, cannon, and ammunition.”]

Justice Story: Congress has power to borrow money, and to provide for the payment of the public debt; yet no particular method is indispensable to these ends. They may be attained by various means.[viii]

Col. Taylor: [The method to be chosen is the one which costs the least—taking subscriptions for the debt. And for repayment, the only way is through commensurate taxation, or in a few situations, sales of unnecessary assets.]

Justice Story: Congress has power to provide a navy; but no particular size, or form, or equipment of ships is indispensable.[ix]

Col. Taylor: [“No particular size, or form, or equipment of ships is indispensable.” I disagree, for there is always a best solution. We all know that there is a whole lot of waste in defense spending, and we can’t just rubber stamp what congress has done.

We can start with a rebuttable presumption that congress was acting intelligently and in good faith. But we can’t rightly cut off all challenges to congressional action. If a plaintiff purports to show that congress appropriated more than was necessary to the common defense, we ought to give him his day in court, for challenges to the necessity and propriety of federal appropriations are just as much constitutional challenges as are challenges under other provisions of the Constitution. It is true that “necessary and proper” challenges might well be difficult for the courts to decide. But the difficulty or impracticality of deciding cannot rightly be a bar to such suits.

And if deciding “necessary and proper” cases creates an overload in the courts, the solution is not to dump the cases, but to add whatever courts as are necessary and proper to handle them efficiently.]

Justice Story: The means of providing a naval establishment are very various; and the applications of them admit of infinite shades of opinion, as to their convenience, utility, and necessity.[x]

Col. Taylor: [I repeat my answer just above,]

Justice Story:  What then is to be done? Are the powers to remain dormant? Would it not be absurd to say, that congress did not possess the choice of means under such circumstances, and ought not to be empowered to select, and use any means, which are in fact conducive to the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution?[xi]

Col. Taylor: [Object to “conducive”. The Constitution says “necessary and proper”. “Conducive” is much broader: “That which may contribute; having the power of forwarding or promoting.”[xii]

Justice Story: Take another example; congress has, doubtless, the authority, under the power to regulate commerce, to erect light-houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers, and authorize the employment of pilots. But it cannot be affirmed, that the exercise of these powers is in a strict sense necessary; or that the power to regulate commerce would be nugatory without establishments of this nature.[xiii]

Col. Taylor: [“Doubtless?”  I would say “highly doubtful” or more accurately, “flatly wrong”.  “Commerce” is trade, that is, sales and purchases of merchandise; commerce is not the instruments by which it is facilitated.][xiv]

Justice Story: In truth, no particular regulation of commerce can ever be shown to be exclusively and indispensably necessary; and thus we should be driven to admit, that all regulations are within the scope of the power, or that none are.[xv]

Col. Taylor: [The commerce clause was designed to create a free-trade zone within the U.S. Therefore a U.S. regulation which prohibits discriminatory tariffs is “indispensably necessary”.]

Justice Story: If there be any general principle, which is inherent in the very definition of government, and essential to every step of the progress to be made by that of the United States, it is, that every power, vested in a government, is in its nature sovereign, and includes, by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the end of such power; unless they are excepted in the Constitution, or are immoral, or are contrary to the essential objects of political society.[xvi]

Col. Taylor: [As he uses the term “requisite”, his statement is accurate.]

Justice Story: There is another difficulty in the strict construction above alluded to, that it makes the constitutional authority depend upon casual and temporary circumstances, which may produce a necessity to-day, and change it tomorrow. This alone shows the fallacy of the reasoning. The expediency of exercising a particular power at a particular time must, indeed, depend on circumstances; but the constitutional right of exercising it must be uniform and invariable; the same today as to-morrow.[xvii]

Col. Taylor: [Coming from Justice Story, the italicized statement is quite surprising at least to the extent that he means the Constitution has a fixed meaning—though I don’t think he really meant that.

In any case, the word “necessary” has a fixed meaning, and it doesn’t mean “expedient”. It is true that what is necessary at a particular time doesn’t mean that it’s always necessary—as, for example, a standing army is not at all times necessary, as the Founders themselves recognized.][xviii]

Justice Story: Neither can the degree, in which a measure is necessary, ever be a test of the legal right to adopt it. That must be a matter of opinion, (upon which different men, and different bodies may form opposite judgments,) and can only be a test of expediency.[xix]

Col. Taylor: [Necessity is absolute and not a matter of degree.]

Justice Story: The relation between the measure and the end, between the nature of the means employed towards the execution of a power, and the object of that power, must be the criterion of constitutionality; and not the greater or less of necessity or expediency. If the legislature possesses a right of choice as to the means, who can limit that choice?

Col. Taylor: [Nor is necessity a matter of “discretion”. If a thing is necessary and proper, it must be done.

Moreover, the legislature does not have a right of choice as to means—the means chosen must be necessary, which I take as meaning the least costly, least intrusive means.]

Justice Story: Who is appointed an umpire, or arbiter in cases, where a discretion is confided to a government? The very idea of such a controlling authority in the exercise of its powers is a virtual denial of the supremacy of the government in regard to its powers. It repeals the supremacy of the national government, proclaimed in the Constitution.[xx]

Col. Taylor: [The umpire is ultimately the parties to the constitutional compact—the state signatories.

And as to the “supremacy of the national government, proclaimed in the Constitution”—objection! There is no national government only a federal government; and it is not supreme; the only thing that is supreme, besides our Creator, is the Constitution.]

Justice Story: It is equally certain, that neither the grammatical, nor the popular sense of the word, “necessary,” requires any such construction. According to both, “necessary” often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to. It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for a government, or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended or understood, than that the interest of the government or person requires, or will be promoted by the doing of this or that thing. Every one’s mind will at once suggest to him many illustrations of the use of the word in this sense. To employ the means, necessary to an end, is generally understood, as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattainable.[xxi]

Col. Taylor: [If “necessary” means “any means calculated to  produce the end”, why doesn’t the Constitution say something like that—such as, “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper Congress deems useful, conducive to, or expedient and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” That would give congress all the plenary power that Justice Story favors and that the Founders and the Constitution rejected. ]

Justice Story: Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind in all situations one single definite idea; and nothing is more common, than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions contain words, which, taken in their rigorous sense, would convey a meaning, different from that, which is obviously intended. It is essential to just interpretation, that many words, which import something excessive, should be understood in a more mitigated sense; in a sense, which common usage justifies. The word “necessary” is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; and is often connected with other words, which increase or diminish the impression, which the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary. It may be little necessary, less necessary, or least necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by any two of these several phrases.[xxii]

Col. Taylor: [Here is the ultimate argument on which Justice Story rests his case for an elastic meaning of “necessary and proper”. Earlier he condemned the practice of deviating from the fixed words of the Constitution, but just now retreats from his earlier assertion. The passage reminds one of the modern day language deconstructionists who contend that words mean what we want them to.]

Justice Story: The tenth section of the first article of the Constitution furnishes a strong illustration of this very use of the word. It contains a prohibition upon any state to “lay any imposts or duties, &c. except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.” No one can compare this clause with the other, on which we are commenting, without being struck with the conviction, that the word “absolutely,” here prefixed to “necessary,” was intended to distinguish it from the sense, in which, standing alone, it is used in the other.

Col. Taylor: [The Constitution there contains the pleonasm, “absolutely” which adds absolutely nothing to “necessary”. Anything that is necessary is absolutely necessary.]

Justice Story: That the restrictive interpretation must be abandoned, in regard to certain powers of the government, cannot be reasonably doubted. It is universally conceded, that the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into execution all sovereign powers, and may be used, although not indispensably necessary. If, then, the restrictive interpretation must be abandoned, in order to justify the constitutional exercise of the power to punish; whence is the rule derived, which would reinstate it, when the government would carry its powers into operation, by means not vindictive in their nature? If the word, “necessary” means needful, requisite, essential, conducive to, to let in the power of punishment, why is it not equally comprehensive, when applied to other means used to facilitate the execution of the powers of the government?[xxiii]

Col. Taylor: [Save for instances of criminal conduct on federal property, where the federal government has exclusive legislative power,[xxiv] and instances where the federal power over certain crimes (treason, counterfeiting, piracy[xxv]) is constitutionally expressed, the power of criminal punishment exists only in the states. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius”: “The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another”.][xxvi]

Coroner: And here once again, let me turn to the Sainted St. George Tucker on the subject of federal crimes.

St. George Tucker: And here we may remark by the way, the very guarded manner in which congress are vested with authority to legislate upon the subject of crimes, and misdemeanors. They are not entrusted with a general power over these subjects, but a few offences are selected from the great mass of crimes with which society may be infested, upon which, only, congress are authorised to prescribe the punishment, or define the offence. All felonies and offences committed upon land, in all cases not expressly enumerated, being reserved to the states respectively. From whence this corollary seems to follow. That all crimes cognizable by the federal courts (except such as are committed in places, the exclusive jurisdiction of which has been ceded to the federal government) must be previously defined, (except treason,) and the punishment thereof previously declared, by the federal legislature.[xxvii]

Coroner: Thank you, Judge. Back now to Justice Story for his discussion of “necessary and proper”.

Justice Story: The restrictive interpretation is also contrary to a sound maxim of construction, generally admitted, namely, that the powers contained in a constitution of government, especially those, which concern the general administration of the affairs of the country, such as its finances, its trade, and its defence, ought to be liberally expounded in advancement of the public good. This rule does not depend on the particular form of a government, or on the particular demarcations of the boundaries of its powers; but on the nature and objects of government itself. The means, by which national exigencies are provided for, national inconveniences obviated, and national prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent, and complexity, that there must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection, and application of those means. Hence, consequently, the necessity and propriety of exercising the authorities, entrusted to a government, on principles of liberal construction.[xxviii]

Col. Taylor: [“Liberally expounded in advancement of the public good” is plainly wrong. The applicable maxim is “power is strictly construed.”][xxix]

Justice Story: It is no valid objection to this doctrine to say, that it is calculated to extend the powers of the government throughout the entire sphere of state legislation. The same thing may be said, and has been said, in regard to every exercise of power by implication and construction. There is always some chance of error, or abuse of every power; but this furnishes no ground of objection against the power; and certainly no reason for an adherence to the most rigid construction of its terms, which would at once arrest the whole movements of the government. The remedy for any abuse, or misconstruction of the power, is the same, as in similar abuses and misconstructions of the state governments. It is by an appeal to the other departments of the government; and finally to the people, in the exercise of their elective franchises.[xxx]

Col. Taylor: [As to the remedy for constitutional abuse, etc., the immediate remedy is impeachment. But, as Mr. Jefferson has said, that is mostly a “scarecrow.” There is also the remedy of suit, as well as the remedy of nullification, if all else fails. And as to, “which would at once arrest the whole movements of the government”, that is a tantalizing thought.]

Justice Story: There are yet other grounds against the restrictive interpretation derived from the language, and the character of the provision. The language is, that congress shall have power “to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper.” If the word “necessary” were used in the strict and rigorous sense contended for, it would be an extraordinary departure from the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited in solemn instruments, to add another word “proper;” the only possible effect of which is to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning, and to present clearly the idea of a choice of means in the course of legislation. If no means can be resorted to, but such as are indispensably necessary, there can be neither sense, nor utility in adding the other word; for the necessity shuts out from view all consideration of the propriety of the means, as contradistinguished from the former. But if the intention was to use the word “necessary” in its more liberal sense, then there is a peculiar fitness in the other word. It has a sense at once admonitory, and directory. It requires, that the means should be, bonâ fide, appropriate to the end.[xxxi]

Col. Taylor: [“Necessary” should not be used in any sense other that its plain sense.]

Justice Story: The character of the clause equally forbids any presumption of an intention to use the restrictive interpretation. In the first place, the clause is placed among the powers of congress, and not among the limitations on those powers.[xxxii]

Col. Taylor: [It’s true that it’s a power, but also a limitation on power.]

Justice Story: In the next place, its terms purport to enlarge, and not to diminish, the powers vested in the government. It purports, on its face, to be an additional power, not a restriction on those already granted. If it does not, in fact, (as seems the true construction,) give any new powers, it affirms the right to use all necessary and proper means to carry into execution the other powers; and thus makes an express power, what would otherwise be merely an implied power. In either aspect, it is impossible to construe it to be a restriction. If it have any effect, it is to remove the implication of any restriction. If a restriction had been intended, it is impossible, that the framers of the Constitution should have concealed it under phraseology, which purports to enlarge, or at least give the most ample scope to the other powers. There was every motive on their part to give point and clearness to every restriction of national power; for they well knew, that the national government would be more endangered in its adoption by its supposed strength, than by its weakness. It is inconceivable, that they should have disguised a restriction upon its powers under the form of a grant of power. They would have sought other terms, and have imposed the restraint by negatives. And what is equally strong, no one, in or out of the state conventions, at the time when the Constitution was put upon its deliverance before the people, ever dreamed of, or suggested, that it contained a restriction of power. The whole argument on each side, of attack and of defence, gave it the positive form of an express power, and not of an express restriction.[xxxiii]

Col. Taylor: [“It is impossible to construe it to be a restriction”. But the words themselves in their true meaning are restrictive.”]

Justice Story: Upon the whole, the result of the most careful examination of this clause is, that, if it does not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain the powers of congress, or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment, in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the national government. The motive for its insertion doubtless was, the desire to remove all possible doubt respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers, which must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid pageant, or a delusive phantom of sovereignty. Let the end be legitimate; let it be within the scope of the Constitution; and all means, which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to the end, and which are not prohibited, but are consistent with the letter and spirit of the instrument, are constitutional.[xxxiv]

Col. Taylor: [Blah, blah, blah. “Delusive phantom”: The real delusive phantom is his argument that “necessary” means “expedient” or “convenient”.]

Justice Story: It may be well, in this connexion, to mention another sort of implied power, which has been called with great propriety a resulting power, arising from the aggregate powers of the national government. It will not be doubted, for instance, that, if the United States should make a conquest of any of the territories of its neighbours, the national government would possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered territory. This would, perhaps, rather be a result from the whole mass of the powers of the national government, and from the nature of political society, than a consequence or incident of the powers specially enumerated. It may, however, be deemed, if an incident to any, an incident to the power to make war.[xxxv]

Col. Taylor: [“Resulting powers”: Another piece of fiction which would justify the unlawful expansion of federal powers. The Constitution limits federal powers to those enumerated.

Also “conquest” is not within any legitimate power of war or defense, except in the temporary and rare circumstance of an occupation necessary for ending a war against the United States or any state by a foreign power.]

Justice Story: Other instances of resulting powers will easily suggest themselves. The United States are nowhere declared in the Constitution to be a sovereignty entitled to sue, though jurisdiction is given to the national courts over controversies, to which the United States shall be a party. It is a natural incident, resulting from the sovereignty and character of the national government. So the United States, in their political capacity, have a right to enter into a contract, (although it is not expressly provided for by the Constitution,) for it is an incident to their general right of sovereignty, so far as it is appropriate to any of the ends of the government, and within the constitutional range of its powers.[xxxvi]

Col. Taylor: [People are no doubt tired by now of my saying that “the United States are not a nation.”[xxxvii] As to the federal power to sue, that is a necessary and proper means of enforcing the Constitution itself as well as other laws rightly made in pursuance of it.

Finally, the same is true with regard to legitimate federal contracts—contracts are always a necessary and proper means of carrying out federal powers. Contracts with postal employees, federal employees, with private parties to buy land and other assets needed, and so on, and on. No one would argue otherwise except, as here, to make a purely rhetorical argument.]

Justice Story: So congress possess power to punish offences committed on board of the public ships of war of the government by persons not in the military or naval service of the United States, whether they are in port, or at sea; for the jurisdiction on board of public ships is everywhere deemed exclusively to belong to the sovereign.[xxxviii]

Col. Taylor: [Another at least partially-flawed argument. The Constitution says Congress has power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”. Thus as to vessels in the port of a state, congress has not the power. It has power only when the vessel is on the high seas beyond state waters.

Also he errs when he suggests jurisdiction is everywhere deemed exclusively to the federal government. It is not everywhere deemed, because it is not so in the United States, there being no general power granted to the federal government over crimes committed within a state.]

Justice Story: And not only may implied powers, but implied exemptions from state authority, exist, although not expressly provided for by law. The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the mint establishment, and all those institutions, which are public in their nature, are examples in point. It has never been doubted, that all, who are employed in them, are protected, while in the line of their duty, from state control; and yet this protection is not expressed in any act of congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts, by which those institutions are created; and is preserved to them by the judicial department, as a part of its functions.

Col. Taylor: [Unsurpassed powers of inference overflow in Justice Story. “Implied exemptions from state authority” is perhaps his greatest overstretch of all. Of course states have power to punish crimes within their territorial limits, as long as the crimes are not committed on federally-owned property. Thus a mailman (or, to be politically correct, I suppose, a “person-person”) who murders on state property is liable to criminal indictment and conviction under state murder law.]

Justice Story: A military provisions contractor cannot be restrained from making purchases within a state . . .

Col. Taylor: [Here, depending upon the citizenship of the contractor, the privileges and immunities clause of Article 4, §2 (pertaining to the interstate equality of privileges and immunities)[xxxix], or the 14th Amendment, §1 (on the intrastate equality of privileges or immunities and due process,)[xl], would protect the contractor from interference by the state. Also, depending on the circumstances, a state restraint on purchases, as unlikely as it would seem, could violate Article 1, §10: “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”

Justice Story: “or [cannot be restrained] from transporting provisions to the place, at which troops are stationed. * * *

Col. Taylor: [Here again the privileges and immunities clauses, due process, and obligations of contract clauses would apply; and in addition, if the contractor were delivering goods from another state, the commerce power prohibiting interference with interstate commerce would override  the state restraint.]

Justice Story: He could not be taxed, or fined, or lawfully obstructed, in so doing. These incidents necessarily flow from the supremacy of the powers of the Union, within their legitimate sphere of action.[xli]

Col. Taylor: [The state could tax the contractor on his income from the sale. He could not rightly be fined or obstructed, because both of those actions would impair the obligations of his contract with the government.]


[i] Stone, Geoffrey et al, Constitutional Law, Little Brown & Co., Boston, Toronto, London (1991) 2nd Ed., p. lxxi.

[ii] Stone, Geoffrey et al, Constitutional Law, Little Brown & Co., Boston, Toronto, London (1991) 2nd Ed., p. lxxi.

[vi] Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 4th Ed.

[xii] Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 4th Ed.

[xiv] Omitted.

[xviii] Omitted.

[xxiv] Omitted.

[xxv] Omitted.

[xxvi] Black’s Law Dictionary (1910) @ http://books.google.com/books?id=R2c8AAAAIAAJ&dq= p. 468.

[xxvii] St. George Tucker, Founders’ Constitution, @ http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_10s6.html.

[xxix] Potestas strict intepretur. Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. @ 1052.

[xxxvii] Omitted.

[xxxix]The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”

[xl]No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

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Published in: on April 17, 2012 at 8:19 am  Leave a Comment  

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